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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to assess whether the impacts of real exchange rate undervaluation 
and domestic technological capabilities on growth are stable across development levels. On 
the one hand, a real exchange undervaluation measure is constructed based on the 
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technological capabilities are accounted for; however, it is more important for developing 
and developed countries than for emerging markets. The results also suggest that 
developing countries grow faster when they are globally competitive in low-technology 
manufacturing and natural-resource-intensive industries. This research attempts to explain 
the lack of significance found in previous studies of the growth impact of real 
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Growth Impacts of the Exchange Rate and Technology 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to assess whether the impacts of real exchange rate undervaluation 
and domestic technological capabilities on growth are stable across development levels. 
On the one hand, a real exchange undervaluation measure is constructed based on the 
purchasing-power-parity theory corrected by the Balassa-Samuelson effect. On the other 
hand, the index of technological specialization is used as a measure of domestic 
technological capabilities. Time-series-cross-section-growth regressions with 
development level interactions are used to test the stability of these variables’ growth 
impact. The results show that real undervaluation is a growth driver across all development 
levels, once technological capabilities are accounted for; however, it is more important for 
developing and developed countries than for emerging markets. The results also suggest 
that developing countries grow faster when they are globally competitive in low-technology 
manufacturing and natural-resource-intensive industries. This research attempts to 
explain the lack of significance found in previous studies of the growth impact of real 
undervaluation in middle-income countries by accounting for an explicit role for domestic 
technological capabilities in the development process. 
 
1. Introduction 
Rodrik (2008) provides empirical evidence and develops theories about the importance 
for developing countries of real exchange rate (RER) undervaluation as a growth-driving 
factor. The author suggests that the transmission channel leading to higher growth rates 
is the increase in the relative price of tradables that RER undervaluation (RERU) implies, 
which should incentivize investment in modern tradable sectors. The author argues that 
these sectors are underdeveloped in these countries because they are disproportionally 
affected by market and government failures. In contrast, the author finds that the growth 
impact of RERU is not significant in the case of developed countries. He explains these 
results as a consequence of the lower sensitivity of modern tradable sectors to RERU, 
given that market and government failures therein are less prevalent in developed 
countries. Nevertheless, by replicating Rodrik’s approach yet considering a third 
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intermediate development level Rapetti, Skott and Razmi (2012) report a significant 
growth impact of RERU in developed and developing countries, although not for the case 
of emerging countries. The authors are surprised by the lack of significance of RERU’s 
growth impact in this latter group of countries, labeling it ‘both a theoretical and empirical 
puzzle’ (Rapetti, Skott, and Razmi 2012, 14). 
Upon first consideration, it is not obvious that higher RERU should increase 
growth rates, since increases in RERU imply real depreciations, which in isolation do not 
always translate into growth. Many empirical studies using the before-after approach to 
analyze depreciations’ output impact have failed to find a positive growth impact due to 
their inability to control for other factors that might affect output during depreciation 
episodes. To control for this, Agénor (1991) considered that there are two types of 
depreciations, expected and unexpected. Using time-series-cross-section (TSCS) 
regressions following this insight, Agénor finds that all the negative impacts of 
depreciations can be attributed to expected depreciations that occur owing to high RER 
overvaluation (RERO). RER depreciations should thus spur growth whenever they are 
not the result of steep RER corrections following large RERO episodes. 
Unfortunately, the discussion presented thus far has overlooked the fact that all 
countries have differing domestic technological capabilities (DTCs). These capabilities 
can be defined as the degree to which natural-resource-intensive industries and low-, mid- 
and high-technology-manufacturing industries are economically viable within a country.1 
Given that technology has been considered the major growth driver in most growth 
theories (Fagerberg 1987), a relative increase in the global competitiveness of a country’s 
mid- and high-technology industries should increase its growth rate, ceteris paribus. 
Historically, the successive wave of countries on sustained economic development paths 
implemented a set of policies aimed at fostering the development of DTCs in mid- and 
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high-technological capabilities (Amsden 1989; Amsden 2001; Lall 2000). However, 
many of the developing countries that have failed to sustain long-term catch-up growth 
also implemented similar policies (Commission on Growth and Development 2008, 48). 
The difference between success and failure cases is that only the successful 
catching-up economies have been able to sustainably shift their economic structure away 
from natural-resource-intensive and low-technology manufactures towards mid- and 
high-technology sectors. While a strand of the political economy literature focuses on the 
importance of industrial and technological policies with an appropriate mix of stick-and-
carrot incentives that aim to build up internationally competitive mid- and high-
technology sectors (Kanchoochat 2015), this study follows Lin’s (2012) ‘new structural 
economics’ view. This view suggests that the type of industries to be promoted needs to 
be related to the level of countries’ DTCs. Despite the debate surrounding how to identify 
such industries (Lin and Chang 2012), one can argue that this view represents a rupture 
with the conventional neo-classic view, which does not give any relevance to the 
economic structure of countries. 
By contrast, one can expect that the path towards high sustained growth rates for 
a country with low DTCs begins by specializing in natural-resource or low-technology-
manufacturing industries that are labor-intensive and less knowledge-intensive, according 
to the view advanced in this piece of research. Such a development strategy has four major 
benefits for low-income countries: it generates high employment levels, higher back- and 
forward linkages, less dependence on imported inputs, as well as lower learning and 
investment needs, at least when compared to mid- and high-technology manufacturing 
sectors. Therefore, such a development strategy will probably be responsible for high-
income multipliers and a lower balance-of-payments (BoP) constraint, which should pave 
the way for a high growth rate. 
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This article aims to test two major hypotheses derived from the previous 
explanation. The first one is to assess whether low-income countries — which one can 
assume to generally have low DTCs — have grown faster when specializing in natural-
resource-intensive and low-technology-manufacturing industries. A related question is to 
establish whether middle-income countries — or the so-called emerging markets2 — have 
achieved higher growth by increasing the relative importance of mid- and high-
technology sectors in their economies. The second hypothesis to test is whether the impact 
of RERU on growth has been the same across development levels, once DTCs are 
controlled for. 
This paper contends that Rodrik (2008) did not obtain a positive and significant 
growth impact of RERU for his sample of developed countries because he used an income 
level that is too low to classify a country as developed. If he had used a higher income 
level as a threshold, he would have found that RERU also has a positive and significant 
growth impact, as in Rapetti et al. (2012). Moreover, this paper argues that Rapetti et al. 
(2012) could not find a significant and positive growth impact of RERU for emerging 
countries because they did not control for DTCs. Such an omission is relevant since one 
can expect that RERU should be a more relevant growth driver for emerging countries 
specialized in mid- and high-technology sectors than those specialized in natural 
resources (especially oil and minerals), which are not so sensitive to the RER. The next 
two sections will briefly review the literature concerned with the growth impact of RER 
misalignments and technology and reassess its lessons. Section 4 presents and analyzes 
evidence concerning the relevance of the development level, before section 5 concludes. 
2. The impact of real exchange rate misalignments on growth 
Nominal devaluations tend to be seen as a tool to correct RERO, which is a RER 
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misalignment often associated with low levels of growth (Corden and Neary 1982; Sachs 
and Warner 2001). Therefore, it is relevant to understand how RER misalignments can 
have an impact on growth. Before briefly reviewing the strand of literature interested in 
the effects of RER misalignments on growth in the second subsection, the main RER 
equilibrum theories will be briefly presented and analyzed in the following subsection. 
2.1. Main real exchange rate equilibrium theories 
Since RER misalignment occurs when the RER differs from its equilibrium value, 
analyzing RER misalignments is closely related to RER equilibrium theories. The 
fundamentals approach — one of the most popular RER equilibrium theories — argues 
that the RER has reached its equilibrium when an economy has simultaneously reached 
its external and internal equilibria (Edwards 1989, 18; Razin and Collins 1999, 59). On 
the other hand, according to the purchasing-power-parity (PPP) theory — in either its 
strong or weak versions — equilibrium RER remains constant across time, whereby the 
law of one price prevails in accordance with its strong version or nominal devaluations 
equate with the difference between foreign and domestic inflation as its weak version 
holds (Dornbusch 1985). 
Needless to say, the PPP approach to RER equilibrium has been subject to great 
criticism; however, it has evolved by allowing equilibrium RER to no longer be constant. 
Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) are often cited as the seminal works providing 
empirical evidence and developing models that explain why the relative price levels of 
non-tradable goods with respect to those of tradable goods —and thus the equilibrium 
RER — increase as countries attain a higher development level. Under the Balassa-
Samuelson corrected PPP theory of equilibrium RER, there will be RER misalignments 
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whenever the domestic price level of a country is either higher or lower than expected 
given its level of income per capita. 
From the perspective of economic development, the problem with the 
fundamentals theory of RER equilibrium is that it considers at least part of real 
appreciations resulting from commodity booms as a movement in a country’s RER 
towards a new equilibrium, given that the terms of trade are one of the determinants of a 
country’s external equilibrium. Therefore, the resulting RER misalignment caused by 
improvements in the terms of trade will in principle be lower when measured according 
to the fundamentals theory than when following the PPP approach corrected by the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect (BSE). A misalignment measure following the latter approach 
will consider most RER appreciations as generating RER misalignment, as long as the 
impact of appreciations on the income level of the country is not very strong. This means 
that a RER misalignment measure derived from this approach will be better able to 
capture the growth slowdown related to RERO that has been underscored in the Dutch 
disease and resource curse literature, as will be further discussed in the next section. 
2.2. Explaining the impact of real exchange rate misalignment on growth: 
theories and evidence 
While there is an extensive body of knowledge concerned with Dutch disease as a theory 
explaining the short-term growth impact of RERO and resource curse as a theory 
explaining the long-term growth impact of RERO, the literature analyzing the growth 
impact of RERU is rather recent and builds upon the literature claiming that RERU can 
be sustained in the medium term (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2007). Rodrik (2008) 
expands the arguments of the Dutch disease and resource curse literature by arguing that 
RERU should have a positive impact on growth because it implies a higher relative price 
of tradables with respect to non-tradables than RER equilibrium warrants. Therefore, 
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RERU should incentivize investments in the tradable sector and especially within 
manufacturing — the author argues — since it increases the return of investors in this 
sector compared to a situation of RER equilibrium. 
Rodrik (2008, p. 375) estimated a TSCS model of annual growth — averaged over 
five-year periods — on initial income and RERU, obtaining empirical evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that RERU had a positive impact on growth for developing 
countries during the 1950–2004 period. In a similar vein, by running Rodrik’s (2008) 
growth regressions with different income thresholds to define developing countries, 
Rapetti et al. (2012) find evidence in favor of a changing relationship between RERU and 
growth, with RERU having a positive and significant impact for low- and high-income 
countries, yet not for middle-income countries. 
Rapetti et al. (2012) point out that the non-significance of the impact of RERU on 
growth in Rodrik’s (2008) sample of richer economies seems to be driven by its lack of 
impact in the so-called emerging economies: a result that puzzles the authors. 
Nevertheless, Glüzmann, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2012) provide empirical 
evidence (similarly based on TSCS regressions) supporting the hypothesis of RERU also 
having a positive and significant impact on growth in emerging markets. Nonetheless, it 
is not clear what criteria the authors employed in classifying a country as an emerging 
market. 
According to Rodrik’s (2008) theory, it is expected that the impact of RERU on 
growth will be lower if the income threshold for the developing country group is 
increased, since his theoretical framework assumes that market and government failures 
affecting the modern tradable sector are less important for countries at higher income 
levels. Nevertheless, by using a higher income per capita threshold to define developed 
countries, Rapetti et al. (2012) find a significant growth impact in developed countries 
 8 
 
and no significant growth impact in middle-income countries. Regarding the transmission 
channel between RERU and growth, one can criticize Rodrik’s (2008) lack of match 
between theory and evidence, since the industries promoted by RERU in low-income 
countries arguably tend not to be part of the mid- or high-technology sectors. Following 
the results of Rajan and Subramanian (2011), the manufacturing sectors promoted by 
RERU in these countries are rather low-technology, labor-intensive sectors such as 
textile, clothing, leather and footwear. 
Last but not least, the lack of growth impact of RERU in emerging countries 
reported in Rapetti et al. (2012) can be interpreted as evidence in favor of the view that 
RERU is not a major source of competitiveness for the industries in which these countries 
compete, which tend to be more technologically-intensive. The income differential 
between emerging and developed countries — which are the main players in the 
international market of mid- and high-technology manufactures — is the base of the cost 
competitiveness of the former, while their mastery of appropriate DTCs should allow 
emerging countries to sustainably grow once their cost competitiveness erodes due to 
increasing incomes.  
Despite the different growth impacts reported in the studies reviewed in this 
section, one can argue that at least a consensus seems to exist concerning the RER 
equilibrium theory used, i.e. the PPP approach corrected by the BSE, as well as the 
econometric approach of TSCS regressions. The literature review in the next section will 
attempt to show how authors have underscored the relationship between development, 
technology and trade patterns. It is hoped that the insights of this literature will make clear 




3. Development, technology and trade patterns 
Theories explaining trade patterns and technological change taking place within 
developing countries hold central importance for research like this, which is focused on 
the topic of growth in the context of economic development, whereby this last term is 
understood as the structural change of a developing country’s economic activities in favor 
of those more intensive in knowledge (Amsden 2001, 2). The following subsection 
includes a brief discussion of the role of technology in classical and neoclassical trade 
theories, as well as a critique of the early developmentalists to these theories. The second 
subsection presents a recent example of a growth theory that considers the importance of 
technology for development and presents an indicator for measuring DTCs. 
3.1. Trade patterns, technology, the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis and 
balance-of-payments constraint 
In a world with developed and developing countries, the Ricardian model predicts that 
developed countries will specialize in high productivity sectors to maintain a high wage 
level. In the Hesckscher-Ohlin setting, if technology is considered a factor of production, 
then developed countries should specialize in the production of technology-intensive 
goods (Demmou 2009). Based on these predictions, one could argue that the optimal 
international labor division would involve developing countries specializing in natural-
resource-intensive and low-technology-manufactured goods and developed countries 
specializing in mid- and high-technology-manufactured goods. 
However, early development economists warned against an apparent secular trend 
against the relative prices of primary goods in comparison to manufactures (Prebisch 
1959; Singer 1950). Such a negative trend in the terms of trade represents a growth 
constraint for developing countries exporting primary goods and importing intermediary 
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and final goods, which can be explained by a low income-elasticity of demand towards 
primary goods (Prebisch 1959, 252). Moreover, as pointed out by Kaldor (1966), the BoP 
can limit growth in developing countries, given that it can be the source of imported input 
and capital bottlenecks or BoP crises, if not properly managed. Furthermore, periods of 
commodity price booms (such as during the 2000s) are not necessarily better for the 
development perspectives of developing countries specialized in the export of natural 
resources, since such periods can increase their natural-resource dependence and hurt 
their industrial sectors, as analyzed by Cypher (2010) in the case of South America during 
the previous decade. 
3.2. Domestic technological capabilities as drivers of economic growth 
DTCs can be understood as the result of cost discovery activities (CDA), which 
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003, 605) define as activities related to the process of 
ascertaining what a country is good at producing. CDA relate more to the developing 
world because finding out the fitness of a country in terms of producing a given good that 
is already produced elsewhere relates more to innovations of the technology assimilation 
type, while innovations that expand the technological frontier tend to occur in developed 
countries (Nelson 2008, 16; Viotti 2002). However, CDA will be undersupplied in the 
absence of government intervention since they generate positive externalities. This means 
that the value for a society of discovering the costs of production in new sectors of activity 
is much greater than what the first investor in this sector — who performed the CDA — 
can appropriate as benefits. This externality can be measured in terms of the benefits 
captured by copycats once costs have been ‘discovered’ by first movers. 
The undersupply of CDA will reduce the growth rate of countries, ceteris paribus. 
In order to exploit Gerschenkron’s advantage of backwardness — i.e. being able to 
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achieve high growth rates thanks to innovations produced elsewhere — governments in 
developing countries need to manage the externality problem generated by CDA. 
However, intervention needs to go beyond intellectual property rights regulation, since 
an important part of CDA will involve the assimilation of standardized foreign 
technology, which cannot be patented yet nevertheless requires high learning investments 
(Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003, p. 624). An indicator such as the Index of Technological 
Specialization (ITS) — defined by Alcorta and Peres (1998) as the ratio of the revealed 
comparative advantage of a country in mid- and high-technology-manufacturing sectors 
over its revealed-comparative advantage in natural-resource-intensive and low-
technology-manufacturing industries — thus seems suited to measure increases in the 
relative importance of DTCs in mid- and high-technology sectors in the developing 
world. A developing country that manages to increase the presence of CDA in its 
economy will set in motion a process of structural transformation that should increase the 
value of its ITS over time, which should not only imply a declining importance of natural-
resource-intensive industries, as Kuznets argued (Niroomand and Nissan 1991), but also 
that of low-technology manufactures. 
A key insight of the literature reviewed in this section is the importance of the 
production structure — and the trade patterns that it reflects — for the growth prospects 
of developing countries. This insight will be empirically analyzed in the next section, 
together with RERU’s potential for increasing growth at different development levels. 
From a theoretical perspective, the main contribution of this research is the argument that 
one should not expect constant growth impacts of RERU and DTCs across development 
levels. From an empirical point of view, it is expected that RERU should have significant 
and positive growth impacts at different development levels, albeit of different 
magnitudes, once DTCs are controlled for. 
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3.3. The relationship between growth and real exchange rate 
undervaluation is moderated by domestic technological capabilities 
One potential reason explaining why the RERU’s positive impact on growth disappears 
for developed countries defined with a relatively low GDP per capita threshold in Rodrik 
(2008) could be that an important proportion of developing countries with an income level 
slightly above this threshold (the so-called emerging markets) compete in industries that 
are not so sensitive to RERU, as is the case with many natural-resource-intensive 
activities. Moreover, as emerging markets increase their presence in mid- and high-
technology sectors, developed countries will need to depend more on RERU when 
competing against emerging countries. As a result, when analyzing the growth impact of 
RERU, it seems justifiable to consider three development stages (low, mid and high) and 
control for DTCs. 
The combination of labor abundance — which in theory should facilitate 
successful competition in labor-intensive goods — and high RERU levels made low-
income developing Asian economies super-competitive in low-technology-manufactured 
goods. However, within high-growth-low-income-developing countries, raising income 
levels can reduce price competitiveness in these sectors. To face this challenge, 
governments essentially have two choices: further repress wage growth to achieve high 
RERU levels or intervene in favor of building up DTCs in mid- and high-technology-
manufacturing sectors (Amsden 2001, 6). Those governments deciding in favor of the 
latter alternative — while keeping an eye on RERU and the BoP constraint — seem to 
have been able to achieve structural transformation and grow faster. Following the 
methodological approach used in the literature, TSCS or panel data regressions will be 
run in the next section to reassess the impact of RERU and DTCs on growth in 
developing, emerging and developed countries, once DTCs are controlled for. 
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4. Relevance of real exchange rate undervaluation and domestic 
technological capabilities 
This section presents and discusses the results of TSCS models used to test the main 
hypotheses of this research. One hypothesis is that RERU should have a positive impact 
on growth across all development levels (low, mid- and high), once DTCs are controlled 
for. The second hypothesis posits that the higher the income level of a developing country, 
the more important the role that DTCs in mid- and high-technology sectors should play 
as a growth driver. 
4.1. Generating the real exchange rate undervaluation variable 
The need to control for the BSE to obtain an equilibrium level of the RER is illustrated 
by data supplied by The Economist (2013) related to the Big Macs index, revealing that 
Big Macs tend to be more expensive in developed countries such as Belgium and Greece 
than in developing countries such as Malaysia. Nonetheless, however illustrative of the 
BSE the price of the Big Mac (a non-tradable good) might be, a proper RER index needs 
to be used to generate a RERU measure. Following Rodrik (2008), I used the nominal 
exchange rate in local currency units per USD over the PPP exchange rate in local 
currency units per international dollars as a measure of the RER. 
Nevertheless, data on these variables was taken from a more recent version — 7.0 
— of the Penn World Table (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011). Last but not least, the 
approach used here to deal with data missingness differs from Rodrik’s (2008, p.373), 
which involved taking five-year averages of his variables of interest, resulting in only 11 
time periods. The several limitations of this approach include the acute loss of degrees of 
freedom and the fact that it causes the new averaged dependent variable to lose variability 
(Honaker and King 2010, 562). For these reasons, the multiple imputation model 
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suggested by Honaker and King (2010) to handle data missingness in both the dependent 
and independent variables was followed. 
 
Table 1. The effect of gross domestic product per capita increases on the real exchange rate, 1985-2004 
Independent variable  
Intercept 1.5348*** 
(0.0824) 
GDP per capita (in logs, PPP 2005 USD) -0.1291*** 
(0.0101) 
  
% of significant year fixed effects 53% 
Observations 3,820 
(N=191, T=20) 
Adjusted R2 0.1046 
LM test p-value 1.2633 x 10-178 
Notes: Panel corrected standard errors in parenthesis; *** p-value<0.01; ** 0.01<p-value<0.05; * 0.05<p-
value<0.10. Year fixed effects reported as significant when their p-value<0.10. 
 
The results presented in Table 1 are obtained after estimating the following equation, 
which was originally proposed by Rodrik (2008, p. 371) and later used within other 
studies, such as Glüzmann et al. (2012) and Rapetti et al. (2012): 
 ln RER𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln RGDPCH𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
therefore, the RERU measure obtained is the error term 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, which constitutes the 
unexplained level of RER that cannot be accounted for by a country’s income level 
(ln RGDPCH𝑖,𝑡) nor by time-specific shocks (𝑦𝑡). One salient feature of the results 
presented in Table 1 is that the BSE estimate (?̂?1 = −0.1291) is almost half the 
magnitude compared to related studies (Glüzmann et al., 2012; Rodrik, 2008). The 
difference in the estimation results could be mainly due to differences in the sampled time 
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period, the approach to dealing with data missingness, as well as the use of a more recent 
data set. Moreover, the results in Table 1 could be criticized due to the model’s low 
goodness of fit (0.1046). However, adding more covariates to improve the goodness of 
fit of the RER model (as conducted in the RER fundamentals literature) may lead to 
arguing that the RER of some countries is close to equilibrium for given periods, when in 
fact it might be over- or undervalued, as argued in section 2.1. 
4.2. Results and discussion 
The main hypothesis of this study is that RERU should be a relevant growth driver across 
development levels, while the advance of a country’s DTCs should play a more important 
role as a growth driver in the case of emerging markets with respect to developing 
countries. The baseline growth model used to test these sub-hypotheses is as follows: 
 GROWTHi,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln RGDPCH𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2ITS𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3RERU𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4ITS𝑖,𝑡 × DEV𝑖 +
𝛽5ITS𝑖,𝑡 × EME𝑖 + 𝛽6RERU𝑖,𝑡 × DEV𝑖 + 𝛽7RERU𝑖,𝑡 × EME𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
in which GROWTH𝑖,𝑡 is defined as the year-on-year percent change in RGDPCH for 
country i in year t, ln RGDPCH𝑖,𝑡−1 is country i’s lagged real GDP per capita level, i.e. 
the usual converge term in growth regressions, ITS𝑖,𝑡 is the country’s ITS in year t, 
RERU𝑖,𝑡 is its real undervaluation measure for the same year, DEV𝑖 and EME𝑖 are binary 
variables if country i is a developing country or emerging market, respectively, and zero 
otherwise, 𝑐𝑖 is country i’s fixed effect, 𝑦𝑡 is the fixed effect for year t and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is an 
idiosyncratic error term. 
The inclusion of both country and year fixed effects allows us to interpret 𝛽2 and 
𝛽3 as the impact that changes in RERU and the ITS have on the growth rate within each 
country. The inclusion of interaction terms allows us to observe whether the impact of 
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these variables differs with respect to the comparator group of countries, which comprises 
developed economies. For instance, this means that the growth impact of RERU in 
developing countries is given by 𝛽3 + 𝛽6. The Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean has a database with ITS values for up to 210 countries and territories 
between 1985 and 2004 (ECLAC 2011). Moreover, the remaining variables needed were 
obtained from the Penn World Table 7.0 (Heston et al., 2011). 
Last but not least, a recent technique developed to deal with data missingness was 
taken into account. A common approach to reducing the bias created by missing data in 
the empirical literature investigating RERU’s growth impact is to use five-year averages 
of the variables of interest in the TSCS regressions (Rodrik 2008; Glüzmann, Levy-
Yeyati, and Sturzenegger 2012; Rapetti, Skott, and Razmi 2012; Razmi, Rapetti, and 
Skott 2012). However, averaging values greatly reduces the number of observations 
available for running regressions. Since the ITS data is only available for a time span of 
20 years, this would have reduced our T to five, which is too low for TSCS analysis. In 
order to run TSCS regressions with annual data given the relative short time span 
availability of the ITS, the empirical analysis of this research addressed the issue of data 
missingness by following the multiple imputation model for TSCS data proposed by 
Honaker and King (2010).  
After removing growth outliers from the sample, the general message of the 
results of specification 6 in Table 2 is in line with the prediction of the hypothesis that 
RERU as a growth driver is positive and significant across all development levels, once 
DTCs are controlled for.3 The results of specification 6 contrast the growth impacts of 
RERU reported in Rodrik (2008, p.375), who reported a positive yet not significant 
coefficient for the case of developed countries, as well as a much larger positive and 
significant coefficient for the case of developing countries. 
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Table 2. The impact of real exchange rate undervaluation and the index of technological specialization on 
growth, 1986–2004a 
Independent variables Specification number 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 
24.2*** 25.16*** 25.11*** 25.58*** 1.083** 0.92* 
(3.42) (3.35) (3.38) (3.45) (0.483) (0.499) 
Lagged GDP per capita (in 
logs, PPP 2005 USD) 
-3.91*** -4.07*** -4.07*** -4.12*** -0.173** -0.151* 
(0.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.58) (0.078) (0.081) 
ITS  
2.24** 2.25** 2.82* 0.026* 0.021 




0.28 -0.1 0.057** 0.067** 
(0.69) (0.71) (1.56) (0.027) (0.027) 
ITS x developing country 
dummy 
   -2.73 -0.028* -0.024 
(1.52) (0.016) (0.017) 
ITS x emerging economy 
dummy 
   0.91 0.012 0.007 
(2.89) (0.011) (0.012) 
RERU x developing 
country dummy 
   0.35 -0.029 -0.027 
(1.26) (0.036) (0.034) 
RERU x emerging 
economy dummy 
   0.68 -0.04 -0.052* 
(1.43) (0.029) (0.028) 
Lagged Growth 
     
-0.007 
      
(0.123) 
% of significant country 
fixed effects 
94 93 93 89 85 78 
% of significant year fixed 
effects 




















Adjusted R-Square 0.18 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.12 0.13 
LM test p-value 0.17 0.35 0.35 0.27 0 0.22 
Notes: Panel corrected standard errors in parenthesis; *** p-value<0.01; ** 0.01<p-value<0.05; * 0.05<p-
value<0.10. Country and year fixed effects reported as significant when their p-value<0.10. a Specifications 5 and 




Moreover, the ITS growth impact proved not to be significant in any country 
group after removing the growth outliers and controlling for the lagged dependent 
(growth) to avoid serial correlation problems, as can be seen in Table 2. This lack of 
significance could be due to the existence of some degree of multicollinearity between 
GDP per capita and the ITS, which have a correlation coefficient of 0.36. Generating an 
ITS corrected for a country’s development level could address this problem. Moreover, 
this transformation addresses endogeneity issues between GDP per capita growth and the 
ITS, since growth is a factor driving technical change according to Kaldor-Verdoorn’s 
law (Porcile and Lima 2010). 
The results of specification 8 in Table 3 provide statistical evidence supporting 
the hypothesis that increases in the development-level corrected ITS (DCITS) have a 
negative impact on growth in developing countries, ceteris paribus.4 This provides 
evidence in favor of the idea that increased competitiveness in mid- and high-tech sectors 
beyond what can be expected for developing countries is probably related to excessive 
processed exports in these sectors. Furthermore, the result points to the idea that 
developing countries following a growth-model based on cheap labor in the labor-
intensive sections of mid- and high-technology manufacturing industries are actually 
hurting their growth prospects. This result is consistent with Jarreau and Poncet (2012), 




Table 3. The impact of real exchange rate undervaluation and the development-level corrected index of 
technological specialization on growth in 158 countries between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s 
Independent variables Specification number 





















































   














Adjusted R-Square 0.12 0.13 
LM test p-value 0.002 0.329 
Time frame 1986-2004 1987-2004 
Notes: Panel corrected standard errors in parenthesis; *** p-value<0.01; ** 0.01<p-value<0.05; * 0.05<p-




The short-run growth impact of increases in the DCITS in developed countries 
(0.011) is positive and not significant, as well as about half the size of the equally non-
significant coefficient of the ITS for developed countries. This means that correcting the 
ITS for the development level of countries did not result in increased DTCs in mid- and 
high-technology sectors having significant growth impacts in developed countries. 
Moreover, the interaction between the developing country dummy and the DTCs proxies 
is negative in specifications 6 and 8, albeit it is only significant when DCITS is used. Last 
but not least, the interaction between the DTCs proxies and the emerging market dummy 
is positive and not significant in both specifications, yet its magnitude doubles in 
specification 8. 
All these results provide evidence in favor of the view that increases in DTCs in 
mid- and high-technology sectors were slightly more relevant for growth in emerging 
markets than in developed countries between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s. Moreover, 
the results suggest that developing countries that specialized in natural resource-intensive 
and low-technology manufacturing sectors had slightly higher growth rates, ceteris 
paribus. Regarding the growth impact of RERU, it was positive and significant in 
specifications 6 and 8 for developed countries, while its growth impact in developing and 
emerging countries is somewhat lower, albeit still significant. Nevertheless, it is only 
significantly lower in the case of emerging markets. 
5. Conclusion 
The results obtained in section 4 provide clearer support in favor of the hypothesis related 
to the growth impacts of RERU across development levels than for the hypothesis related 
to the different growth impacts of DTCs. This suggests that the empirical evidence in 
favor of the hypothesis that RERU should also be positive and significant for the case of 
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emerging markets was robust. By contrast, the evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
the growth impact of increases in DTCs in mid- and high-technological manufacturing 
sectors should be greater in emerging economies with respect to developing countries was 
less conclusive. Nonetheless, the results support the idea that RERU should also play an 
important role in the development strategies of emerging markets. Finally, as the results 
suggest that processed exports of mid- and high-technology manufactures negatively 
affect growth in developing countries, analyzing the direction of trade of these types of 
manufactures in developing and emerging countries seems a promising future research 
endeavor that could help to shed light on whether the direction of trade is a relevant 
characteristic to make the DTCs proxies’ growth impact significant. 
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